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A NEW TWIST IN THE ABORTION
FUNDING CONTROVERSY: PLANNED
PARENTHOOD v. ARIZONA
In 1983 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced
a novel situation: whether a discriminatory state funding program violated
the Constitution of the United States. ' The Arizona legislature enacted an
appropriations scheme for fiscal year 1980-81 under which no nongovern-
mental entity could receive state funds for family planning if that entity pro-
vided abortion counseling. 2 Planned Parenthood3 challenged the constitu-
tionality of that appropriations scheme in federal court. In Planned Paren-
thood v. Arizona,4 the district court found that the funding scheme violated
Planned Parenthood's first amendment rights.' The Ninth Circuit reversed
and held that Arizona was not constitutionally required to fund abortion-
1. Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 718 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1983).
2. Id. at 941 n.l. The court quoted the pertinent law:
No state money may be spent by the department of economic security by contract,
grant, or otherwise, on abortions, abortion procedures, counseling for abortion pro-
cedures or abortion referrals. These restrictions are not applicable when it is necessary
to save the life of a pregnant woman.
No state money, other than money for comprehensive medical and dental care
and the developmentally disabled, may be given by the department of economic
security by contract, grant, or otherwise to agencies or entities which offer abor-
tions, abortion procedures, counseling for abortion procedures or abortion refer-
rals. Governmental agencies or entities are exempt from the restrictions in this
paragraph.
Id. (quoting 1980 Ariz. Sess. Laws 842, 860 n*).
The Supreme Court has ruled that a state participating in the medicaid program is not
obligated to reimburse the abortion expenses of indigent women even though it has made a
policy choice to reimburse expenses incident to childbirth. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); see infra note 31 and accompanying text. The Court has
not decided, however, whether a state may fund non-abortion counseling while denying funds
for abortion counseling. This Recent Case will focus on Arizona's refusal to subsidize speech
about abortion while subsidizing non-abortion speech. Furthermore, for purposes of this Re-
cent Case, the term "abortion counseling" will denote the equivalent of Arizona's terms "counsel-
ing for abortion procedures" and "abortion referrals." Abortion counseling encompasses those
situations in which family planning counselors describe to clients the procedures used in an
abortion, see infra note 29, and give women names of facilities which will perform abortions.
3. In this Recent Case, Planned Parenthood refers collectively to Planned Parenthood of
Central and Northern Arizona and Planned Parenthood of Southern Arizona. See 718 F.2d
at 941. Both litigants in the case offer abortion counseling and referrals. Planned Parenthood
of Central and Northern Arizona also performs abortion procedures. Id.
4. 537 F. Supp. 90 (D. Ariz. 1982), rev'd, 718 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1983).
5. 537 F. Supp. at 92. The amendment states in relevant part: "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend I. The amendment has been
incorporated through the fourteenth amendment to apply to the states. E.g., Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
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related speech activities when it funded non-abortion speech activities. 6 The
appellate court therefore remanded the case to allow Arizona an opportunity
to prove that withdrawal of all funds from Planned Parenthood was the
only way to ensure that no state monies would be used for abortion
counseling.7 The court recognized, in effect, that if Arizona failed to show
that Planned Parenthood could not keep separate accounts for its abortion
and non-abortion activities, the appropriations scheme would place an un-
constitutional penalty on Planned Parenthood's right to offer abortion
counseling.' This penalty would be the result of requiring Planned Parent-
hood to choose either to receive government funding and provide only non-
abortion-related services, or to reject government funding and continue to
offer abortion-related services. The court, however, failed to realize that an
unconstitutional penalty still exists.'
Unlike prior abortion cases, Planned Parenthood's first amendment right
to provide abortion counseling was at stake.'" Although the Supreme Court
has held that the government need not fund abortion procedures when
funding childbirth procedures for indigent women," the Court has not
addressed the issue of abortion-related speech. The Ninth Circuit failed to
realize that allowing Arizona to deny funds for abortion counseling created
an unconstitutional content-based distinction.'" Consequently, Planned Paren-
6. 718 F.2d at 944; see infra note 29 and accompanying text.
7. 718 F.2d at 946.
8. Id. at 945. The court stated that a statute which simply prohibited the use of state
money for abortion-related activity would infringe less on Planned Parenthood's right to offer
abortion and engage in abortion counseling. Id.
9. See infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
10. Most abortion cases have applied a substantive due process analysis to determine whether
the involved state action infringed upon a woman's right to decide whether to continue a
pregnancy. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 645 (1979) (parental consent law unduly
interferes with minor's right to an abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
69 (1976) (spousal consent requirement interferes with a woman's right to decide whether to
continue a pregnancy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (right of privacy is broad enough
to include a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy); cf. Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980) (prohibition of Medicaid payments for an abortion does not abridge
a woman's decisional right).
A few abortion cases, however, have involved a first amendment speech claim. See, e.g.,
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (free speech violation to prohibit dissemination of
information about abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Kempiners, 568 F. Supp. 1490 (N.D. I11.
1983) (a woman's first amendment right to receive information about abortion violated by state
scheme that funded only non-abortion counseling); Young Women's Christian Ass'n v. Kugler,
342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J.), aff 'd, 493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1972) (statute prohibiting physicians
from advising women on how to induce an abortion was unconstitutionally vague and deterred
exercise of first amendment rights), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
11. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); see also Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (state
not required to fund non-therapeutic abortions as a condition for participation in the Medicaid
program); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (decision in Maher applicable to cities as well
as states).
12. See infra notes 49-81 and accompanying text.
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thood's first amendment speech rights have been violated by the Arizona
funding program. In addition, a woman's fundamental right to make an
informed decision, in consultation with her physician, as to whether to con-
tinue a pregnancy is abridged by Arizona's disparate funding scheme.' 3 This
refusal to subsidize abortion counseling ensures that no counselor funded
solely by state money may impart information about abortion to pregnant
women who seek counseling on their pregnancy options.'
This Recent Case will address these three problems with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's opinion: that its penalty analysis is incomplete; that Planned Parent-
hood's free speech rights continue to be abridged; and that women's due
process rights are infringed. Disparate state funding of family planning ser-
vices has been analyzed rarely by the courts,' 5 and the Ninth Circuit is the
highest federal court to rule on these issues. If not checked, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's analysis threatens to be an important, but dangerously incorrect,
precedent.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF Planned Parenthood
Congress enacted Title XX of the Social Security Act' 6 to assist states
in providing social services. Under Title XX, a state may directly provide
a service or the state may contract with private entities to provide a service."
13. See infra notes 82-108 and accompanying text.
14. In this Recent Case, the term "state-funded counselor" will refer to a family planning
counselor funded solely by the state in a nongovernmental family planning organization under
contract with a state to provide social services.
Another problem with the Arizona funding scheme, which will be mentioned only briefly
here, is that governmental agencies providing family planning services are exempt from the
denial of state funding based upon abortion services. One federal appellate court has held that
discriminating between types of facilities for the grant of state funds is a denial of equal pro-
tection. See Planned Parenthood v. Minnesota, 612 F.2d 359 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 448 U.S. 901 (1980).
15. Three other federal courts have declared similar statutes unconstitutional. In Planned
Parenthood Ass'n Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 568 F. Supp 1490 (N.D. Il1. 1983), the court
held that funding non-abortion counseling but not funding abortion counseling violated a woman's
due process right to decide whether to abort. Id. at 1496. It also violated a woman's first
amendment right to receive information about abortion. Id. In Valley Family Planning v. North
Dakota, 489 F. Supp. 238 (D.N.D. 1980), aff'd, 661 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1981), the district court
held that North Dakota's refusal to fund abortion referrals while funding non-abortion refer-
rals unconstitutionally penalized Valley Family Planning's free speech rights. 489 F. Supp. at
243. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found the statute prohibiting funding of abortion referrals
invalid under the Supremacy Clause, and thus did not reach the constitutional questions. 661
F.2d at 99. In Planned Parenthood v. Minnesota, 612 F.2d 359 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 448 U.S.
901 (1980), the court struck down a statute that denied state funding for pre-pregnancy counseling
to abortion providers that performed abortion counseling as violating the equal protection
clause because the statute exempted hospitals and health maintenance organizations.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (Supp. Il1 1979), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (1982).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1397(e) (Supp. 1983). Title XX is a federal grant-in-aid program wherein
the federal government provides 900 of the funding for a social program offered by the state
and the state provides the remaining 10% of the necessary funds. The title programs under
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Family planning service is one social service covered by Title XX.'I Arizona,
as a participant under Title XX, contracted with Planned Parenthood to
provide family planning services for Arizona residents. Planned Parenthood
received governmental funding for its family planning services prior to fiscal
year 1980-81.'
For fiscal year 1980-81, however, the State of Arizona appended a foot-
note to its General Appropriations Bill that prohibited any nongovernmen-
tal organization offering "abortions, abortion procedures, counseling for
abortion procedures or abortion referrals" 2 from receiving state funding.
Consequently, Arizona denied Planned Parenthood funding for fiscal year
1980-81, solely because one part of Planned Parenthood's comprehensive
family planning program included abortion and abortion-related speech
activity."
Planned Parenthood brought suit in federal district court challenging the
constitutionality of Arizona's disparate funding scheme. 2 Specifically,
Planned Parenthood made two constitutional arguments. First, Planned
Parenthood contended that the statute penalized it for exercising its right
to counsel for abortion.3 Second, it argued that Arizona could not con-
stitutionally distinguish between different points of view when funding family
planning services." The district court accepted both arguments. It held that
compliance with the appropriation bill's requirement that a provider forego
counseling for abortion and abortion referrals penalized Planned Parenthood's
first amendment right to disseminate abortion information. 5 The court also
the Social Security Act are premised on both the federal and state governments contributing
a specified percentage of the cost of a service. Neither government is expected to pay the full
cost for a service or any part of a service. Thus, if Planned Parenthood were to get state
funding only for non-abortion counseling, Planned Parenthood could not use federal matching
funds for its abortion counseling. It would have to find private funds if it wished to provide
abortion counseling. See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308-09 (1980) (discussing
Title XIX of the Social Security Act).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1397a(a)(2)(A) (1982).
19. Brief for Appellees at 5, Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 718 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees]. It is interesting to note that for fiscal year 1979-80,
the Arizona legislature attempted to enact a similar statute, but the statute singled out Planned
Parenthood for denial of state funds. The proposed bill was dropped after the Arizona Attorney
General issued an opinion stating that the bill would be unconstitutional. Brief for Plaintiffs
at 44-45, Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 537 F. Supp. 90 (D. Ariz. 1982), rev'd, 718 F.2d
938 (9th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiffs]. Prior to the appendage of the
footnote to the appropriation bill, Planned Parenthood had received more than $130,000 in
Title XX funds. Brief for Appellees, supra, at 5.
20. 718 F.2d at 941 n.I; see supra note 2.
21. 537 F. Supp. at 91. State officials authorized to disburse state money acknowledged
during depositions that, but for the appended footnote, Planned Parenthood would be eliglible
for state money. Brief for Appellees, supra note 19, at 6.
22. 537 F. Supp. at 90.
23. Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 19, at 21-26.
24. Id. at 19.
25. 537 F. Supp. at 92. The court recognized that in forcing Planned Parenthood to choose
between receiving state money and engaging in abortion counseling, Arizona was trying to restrict
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recognized that Arizona had created an impermissible content-based
distinction26 without a compelling justification.2 7 The court granted summary
judgment for Planned Parenthood and permanently enjoined Arizona's
disparate funding scheme.2"
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Arizona was not re-
quired to fund abortion counseling even though the state funded non-abortion
counseling.29 The Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Maher v. Roe,30 which upheld the right of a state to fund childbirth expenses
and not abortion expenses. 3' The court of appeals perceived no distinction
Planned Parenthood's first amendment speech rights. The court declared that because Arizona
cannot directly outlaw abortion speech, Arizona cannot indirectly attempt to curtail abortion
speech. Id.
26. Id. at 91-92.
27. Id. at 93.
28. Id. In addition, the district court found the term "counseling for abortion procedures"
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 92. The court stated that it did not know whether the phrase
forbade advocacy of abortion or merely mentioning abortion as one alternative to a pregnancy.
Further, the court did not know whether it would make a difference if the client broached
the subject. Id.
29. 718 F.2d at 944. The appellate court also reversed the vagueness finding of the lower
court. Id. at 946. The Ninth Circuit, however, was unclear in defining the scope of the term
"counseling for abortion procedures." Id. On the one hand, the court refers to the Arizona
Attorney General's opinion that defines the term as an explanation of the abortion procedure.
The Attorney General's opinion explained that there should be no interference with the counselor-
client relationship under this definition. Id. at 948 (quoting No. 179-252 Op. Ariz. Att'y Gen.
3 n.5 (Oct. 11, 1979)). On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit seemingly adopts the Attorney
General's definition, but then goes further to define the term to include only counseling about
the actual abortion procedure with women who have decided to undergo an abortion. Id. at
949. This definition seems to be narrower than the Attorney General's definition. Nonetheless,
by either definition, counselors would be prohibited from describing abortion procedures to
a woman who had decided to undergo an abortion and who desired more information.
This could lead to an anomaly. A state-funded counselor confronted by a client who said
that she did not know what she wanted to do with a pregnancy could receive a description
of an abortion procedure, whereas a woman who had decided to undergo an abortion could
not receive the same description or even receive a referral to a facility where an abortion could
be obtained. Moreover, if the definition of the term "counseling for abortion procedures"
includes a description of the actual procedure, then a state grantee which advocated that abor-
tion is immoral, when describing the "horrors" of the procedure to a woman who had decided
to abort, would be violating the Arizona legislature's prohibition. Prohibiting anti-abortionists
from describing the procedure in an attempt to convince a woman to forego an abortion would
presumably circumvent the purpose of the statute.
30. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
31. Id. at 479. The Supreme Court held in Maher that there was no equal protection viola-
tion when a state, participating under Medicaid, refused to reimburse expenses incident to non-
therapeutic abortions for indigent women while reimbursing childbirth expenses. Id. at 474.
The Court premised its holding upon the finding that no constitutional right had been infringed
by the refusal to fund abortion expenses. Id. at 474. The Court announced that the right recogniz-
ed in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was the right to decide to abort without interference
from the state. 432 U.S. at 473-74. According to the Maher Court, the funding scheme placed
no obstacles in a woman's decisionmaking process. Id. at 474.
For a critique of the Supreme Court's decision in Maher and related cases, see Note, The
Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Exclusion of Therapeutic Abortions from Medicaid Coverage, 94
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between a disparate funding program for medical procedures and a disparate
funding program for speech about medical procedures. 2 Relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in Maher, the court found Arizona's refusal to
fund abortion counseling constitutional. 33
The court noted, however, that the funding scheme denied all state money
to Planned Parenthood even though only part of Planned Parenthood's total
program involved non-abortion counseling." The court stated that Arizona's
policy of not funding abortion counseling might be realized by simply pro-
hibiting state grantees from using state funds for abortion-related speech
activity, rather than withholding all funds." Consequently, the appellate court
reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case to provide
Arizona an opportunity to prove that withholding all state funds from
Planned Parenthood was the only way to ensure that no state money would
be used for abortion counseling.36
ANALYSIS
A. The Penalty Analysis
The Supreme Court has recognized that a state may not base the receipt
of a government benefit on the forfeiture of a constitutional right. 7 For
example, in Speiser v. Randall,38 the Court struck down a law denying tax
HARV. L. REV. 96 (1980); Note, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Public Funding of Abor-
tions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 137 (1977).
An analogy used in Maher and relied on by the Ninth Circuit was that although a state
may not prohibit the existence of private educational facilities, it was not required to subsidize
private facilities while subsidizing public ones. 718 F.2d at 944. It is one thing for a state
to fund public schools without funding private schools, but it is quite another for a state to
contract with private entities to offer "public services" and then deny funds for an impermissi-
ble reason. Where a state contracts with a private entity, the state has, in effect, made that
private entity equal to a public one. Although Arizona did not have to contract with private
family planning providers, once it did so it could not deny funds for impermissible reasons.
See infra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
32. 718 F.2d at 944.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 945.
35. Id. It was unclear to the court whether the statute was drawn narrowly enough to have
the least amount of infringement on Planned. Parenthood's rights. Id.
36. Id. at 946. It is interesting to note that the court remanded to allow Arizona the chance
to prove that withholding all funds was the only way to ensure that no state money would
be used for abortion-related activity. Later in the opinion, however, the court acknowledged
that Planned Parenthood had already been keeping sufficiently separate records on its abortion
and non-abortion activity. Id. at 948.
37. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (denial of unemployment benefits
to one who quit work based on a conflict with religious beliefs after being transferred to a
war munitions section penalized individual's free exercise of religion); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972) (dismissal from state university teaching position, if based on professor's
speeches about the administration of the university, penalized professor's first amendment speech
right); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (denial of welfare benefits to persons who
have not resided in a state for one year penalized fundamental right to travel).
38. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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exemptions to certain veterans solely because they refused to sign an oath
pledging not to advocate the overthrow of the government.39 In the Court's
view, the denial of the tax exemption was the equivalent of the imposition
of a criminal sanction-it served to deter expression of a particular view. 4
The Court held, therefore, that once the government created the tax benefit,
the receipt of that benefit could not be conditioned upon the recipient's
foregoing a constitutional right.
4
'
Similarly, Arizona conferred a benefit by subsidizing organizations pro-
viding family planning services," 2 and Planned Parenthood has a first amend-
ment right to disseminate information about abortion. 3 Under the funding
scheme enacted by the Arizona legislature, Planned Parenthood may receive
state money for non-abortion-related activity only if it does not engage in
abortion-related speech activity." Planned Parenthood was offered a choice:
receiving state funds or continuing its abortion counseling service.4 1 Instead
39. Id. at 529.
40. Id. at 518. The Court analogized the deterrent effect on speech to a situation where
the state had imposed a fine on the veterans' speech. The Court recognized that basing the
receipt of a tax exemption on foregoing a free speech right was indirectly producing a result
that the state could not command directly. Id. at 526; see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 718 (1980) (first amendment infringement is substantial even where compulsion to
forego the constitutional right is indirect); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 n.5 (1963)
(citing American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)) (indirect restraints
on first amendment rights are just as coercive as criminal sanctions).
41. 357 U.S. at 518; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), where the Supreme
Court stated:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a
person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some
reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to
a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially
his interest in free speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person
because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those
freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the govern-
ment to "produce a result which [it] could not command directly." Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 526. Such inference is impermissible.
408 U.S. at 597.
42. Just as the tax exemption in Speiser was gratuitously given, so funding family planning
services is a voluntary benefit given by Arizona. 718 F.2d at 941.
43. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (right to disseminate information about
abortion is protected by the first amendment).
44. 718 F.2d at 941 n.l. The Arizona funding scheme seeks to control the type of informa-
tion Planned Parenthood is allowed to disclose to its clients. Although the statute did not
impose a criminal sanction on Planned Parenthood for abortion related speech, this indirect
encroachment on Planned Parenthood's free speech rights may only be justified by a vital govern-
mental interest. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976) (plurality opinion) (conditioning
the retention of public employment on the employee's support of a particular political party
must serve a vital public interest). Arizona had no vital interest that justified this indirect en-
croachment. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
45. 537 F. Supp. at 92. Compliance with Arizona's statute would prohibit Planned Parent-
hood from exercising its first amendment right to disseminate abortion information. In Planned
Parenthood Ass'n Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 568 F. Supp. 1490 (N.D. Ill. 1983), the court
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of striking down the disparate funding scheme as an unconstitutional penalty,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that if Arizona could prove that the denial of
all funding was the only way to ensure that Planned Parenthood would not
use state funds for abortion-related activity, then the statute would be
permissible.' 6 Yet where a statute "on its face imposes a penalty on the ex-
ercise of constitutional rights,"' 7 it is invalid and should be struck down.'8
The court erred, therefore, in remanding the case to permit Arizona to prove
that Planned Parenthood was unable to keep separate accounts on its abor-
tion and non-abortion services. An unconstitutional penalty, narrowly con-
strued, is still a penalty.
B. Planned Parenthood's First Amendment Claim
The Ninth Circuit held that Arizona was not constitutionally required to
fund abortion counseling when it elected to fund non-abortion counseling.
The court failed to recognize that Planned Parenthood's first amendment
speech rights were infringed.' 9 In upholding Arizona's discriminatory funding
system, the appellate court relied on Maher,"° which upheld a state's deci-
sion to provide Medicaid reimbursement for the childbirth, but not the abor-
tion, expenses of indigent women."
In Maher the funding scheme was challenged as an impermissible infr-
ingement on a woman's fundamental right to choose whether to continue
a pregnancy.2 In rejecting this claim, the Maher Court reasoned that the
state funding scheme did not interfere with a woman's decision to terminate
a pregnancy, but only made childbirth a more attractive alternative.53 The
faced a similar appropriation scheme. That court struck down the statute as being facially in-
valid. The court held that a state may not constitutionally disqualify an otherwise eligible can-
didate for non-abortion funds solely because another part of the candidate's overall program
included abortion-related activities. Id. at 1495.
Likewise, in Valley Family Planning v. North Dakota, 489 F. Supp. 238 (D.N.D. 1980),
aff'd, 661 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1981), North Dakota enacted a funding scheme that provided
that no state money could be used by any person or public or private agency which performs,
refers, or encourages abortion. 489 F. Supp at 240. The district court first held that disseminating
information about abortion is protected speech under the first amendment. The court then
held that it was unconstitutional for North Dakota to condition receipt of state funds on the
recipient's surrendering of a constitutional right, i.e., speaking about abortion. Id. at 242.
46. 718 F.2d at 946.
47. Planned Parent Ass'n v. Kempiners, 700 F.2d 1115, 1123 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
(Cudahy, J., Separate Opinion).
48. Id. The duty of a federal court is to decide whether a statute is unconstitutional when
a party is suffering a real injury such as deprivation of funds. Id.
49. The court admitted that Arizona had made advocation of non-abortion procedures a
more attractive alternative, but that Arizona had not directly interfered with access to abor-
tions or the free flow of information concerning abortion counseling. 718 F.2d at 944.
50. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
51. 432 U.S. at 479.
52. Id. at 471.
53. Id. at 474. The Court distinguished its decision from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
in which the Court held that a woman had a fundamental right to decide whether to continue
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Court held that because a woman's decisional right was not infringed,5" reim-
bursing childbirth expenses and not abortion expenses rationally served the
state's interest in protecting potential life. 5 The Maher Court recognized,
however, that a refusal to subsidize, if based on constitutionally impermissi-
ble reasons, would be invalid. 6
The Ninth Circuit found Maher to be controlling. The court perceived
no distinction between upholding nonreimbursement for abortion procedures
and allowing non-subsidization of abortion-related speech activity. 7 The court
stated that "Arizona's decision to refuse to fund abortion and abortion-
related speech activities may make childbirth and advocation of childbirth
more attractive alternatives, but it has imposed no restriction on access to
abortions or on the free flow of information concerning abortion." 8 The
Ninth Circuit, therefore, found no constitutional infirmity in allowing Arizona
to fund only non-abortion speech. 9
a pregnancy. 432 U.S. at 474. The Maher Court stated that the right announced in Roe was
the right to be free from state interference in the decision making process. Id. at 473-74. A
state's funding of one medical procedure but not another, therefore, did not unduly interfere
with the decisional process. Id. at 474.
54. 432 U.S. at 474. The Supreme Court has at least two different tests which it applies
to alleged constitutional defects. If a suspect classification or a fundamental right is infringed
by state action, the Court imposes strict scrutiny, i.e., the state action must be necessary to
further a compelling interest. If no suspect class or fundamental right is impinged upon, the
state action must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 470 (citing San Antonio
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)).
55. 432 U.S. at 478. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court recognized
that a state does have an interest in protecting potential life, but this interest does not become
compelling until the fetus is viable. Id. at 163. The Court determined the fetus to be viable
during the third trimester of pregnancy. Id. A state, therefore, could not justify abridging a
woman's decision-making process until viability. Id. at 164-65.
Conversely, in Maher, the funding scheme did not infringe upon a woman's fundamental
right, and therefore, it need only survive lower level scrutiny. 432 U.S. at 478. Because the
funding scheme influenced a woman to choose childbirth over abortion, it furthered a legitimate
state interest in protecting potential life. Id. at 478.
56. 432 U.S. at 469-70. The use of government funds is subject to constitutional limita-
tions. Id.
57. See supra note 49.
58. 718 F.2d at 944.
59. The Ninth Circuit's opinion cited a federal district court decision from Illinois involving
a similar issue. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood Ass'n-Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 531 F.
Supp. 320, 325 (N.D. II1. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 700 F.2d 115 (7th
Cir. 1983)). The Ninth Circuit used this opinion as support for its decision that Arizona did
not have to fund abortion speech while funding non-abortion speech. Id. The Ninth Circuit
erroneously declared that the district court upheld the Illinois statute. Id. Although the Ninth
Circuit correctly quoted from the district court opinion, that section was analyzed as an equal
protection claim. Indeed, the district court held the statute to be an unconstitutional violation
of the first and fourteenth amendments. 531 F. Supp. at 327. The district court again heard
the case and reaffirmed its prior decision on the substantive issues. Planned Parenthood Ass'n
Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 568 F. Supp. 1490 (N.D. I11. 1983). The district court in Kem-
piners expressly found that Illinois, by refusing to fund abortion counseling while funding non-
abortion counseling, had created an impermissible content-based distinction. 531 F. Supp. at
330-31. The district court stated that giving preferential treatment to one viewpoint in the form
of a subsidy was forbidden by the first amendment. Id. at 331.
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The flaw in the Ninth Circuit's holding is its failure to recognize Planned
Parenthood as a free speech case, not an abortion case.60 The court missed
the critical difference between refusal to fund one type of speech while
funding another.6 The controlling distinction between an action (e.g. abor-
tion procedure) and speech is that the Supreme Court rigorously guards
against content-based speech distinctions.62 Maher allowed a state to be non-
neutral in funding different medical acts because the Court considered no
fundamental right to be infringed. 3 The content-based distinction in the
Arizona statute does infringe Planned Parenthood's free speech rights.
Planned Parenthood deserved the rigorous protection that the Supreme Court
has accorded to subjects of content-based distinctions.
The Ninth Circuit ignored numerous Supreme Court decisions that require
a state, absent a compelling reason, to be neutral with respect to the con-
60. The Ninth Circuit failed to distinguish clearly between the individual interests at stake
in Maher and those at stake in the case before it. Maher involved a woman's right to an
abortion. 432 U.S. at 474. In Planned Parenthood, the issue was Planned Parenthood's right
not to have its first amendment speech right infringed. See 718 F.2d at 942. The appellate
court perceived no distinction between the two constitutional rights. Id. at 942-46. But see
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815 n.5 (1975) (right to disseminate information about abor-
tion is governed by first amendment principles, not abortion law principles).
61. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940) (Supreme Court declared that
the basic purpose of the first amendment was to ensure that all points of view are brought
to the public's attention); see also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) (first
amendment speech rights need to be protected diligently from subtle and indirect attempts by
a state to stifle a particular view).
62. Content-based discrimination arises where a state "accords preferential treatment to the
expression of views on one particular subject." Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980);
see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1982) (noting the importance of preventing content-
based distinctions); Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)
(first amendment hostile to state action based on content of speech); Police Dept. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content").
The significance and scope of the Court's commitment to content neutrality is a topic of
lively academic debate. See, e.g., Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A
Revisionist View, 68 Gao. L. REv. 727 (1980) (suggesting modified approach to neutrality);
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975)
(explaining that essence of free speech where government may not dictate which views shall
be heard); Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV.
113 (1981) (rejecting need for maintaining content neutrality); Stephan, The First Amendment
and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982) (suggesting alternative analysis for
treating content-based regulations); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983) (distinguishing between various speaker and content based
regulations); Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-
Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81 (1978) (general form of content-based discrimina-
tion is where state action sponsors differential treatment to views on a particular subject); Stone
& Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality As A Command of The First Amendment,
1983 Sup. CT. REV. 583 (noting that content neutrality concerns may be overridden by the
need to preserve ideas in the political marketplace).
63. 432 U.S. at 474; see supra note 31.
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tent of fully protected speech.6 ' Partially protected speech65 and unprotected
speech66 are scrutinized less strenuously. 7 But the Supreme Court has
recognized that informing others about abortion is fully protected speech.6 "
Once speech is accorded first amendment protection, the Court has stead-
fastly refused to allow the government to provide preferential treatment to
one side of a controversial issue.69 Instead, the government must remain
neutral to the content of fully protected speech.
64. The parameters of fully protected speech are expanding, with political speech enjoying
rigorous protection. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("major purpose of [First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs"). The Supreme Court,
however, has extended strict protection beyond the political speech arena to many diverse areas.
See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (religious speech); Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455 (1980) (labor picketing); City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board discussions); Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (nude scenes at drive-in theaters). It can be argued that
all speech deserves full protection unless it falls into a category defined by the court as deserv-
ing less than full protection. See infra 65-67 and accompanying text; cf. Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (Court stated that "[all ideas having even the slighest redeem-
ing social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevail-
ing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the [first amendment] guarantees.")
65. For example, commercial speech is partially protected speech. Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980). It may also include con-
duct. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06
(1969) (wearing armbands is the equivalent of "pure speech" and is fully protected) with United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (conduct, such as burning one's draft card, even
when used to express an idea, will not be accorded full first amendment protection).
66. Unprotected speech includes: fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942); incitement to subversive activity, Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969); libel, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1963); obscenity, Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973); and deceptive advertising, Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980).
67. Unprotected speech receives no protection from the Constitution. Restrictions on this
speech, therefore, need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942). Partially protected speech restrictions are
subject to still different standards. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (commercial speech); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968) (symbolic conduct). Fully protected speech restrictions, however, deserve rigorous scrutiny.
See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) ("[W]here . . . a prohibition is
directed at speech itself, . . . the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest
that is compelling").
68. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827-29 (1975).
69. The first amendment is violated when a legislature attempts to ensure that only one
side of a controversial issue is expressed to the public. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 785-86 (1978). Once a government has allowed discussion of certain topics, it should not
discriminate among differing views. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103
S. Ct. 948, 963 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Indeed, in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983), even
the Justices who would have upheld the various ordinances regulating abortion services recognized
that a counselor's first amendment right would be violated if a state required the counselor
to communicate the state's position on the abortion controversy to clients. Id. at 2515 n.16
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Arizona, by enacting an appropriation scheme that funds non-abortion
but not abortion counseling,70 has created a content-based distinction. Arizona
funds a multitude of family planning services. Abortion counseling is simply
one aspect of Arizona's family planning services. For the state to prohibit
the use of state money for abortion-related speech, while continuing to fund
non-abortion related speech, creates a content-based regulation.7 The receipt
of funds is based solely on the content of speech. Although the Supreme
Court has not squarely addressed disparate funding with respect to abortion
related speech, the Court's previous decisions firmly hold that a regulation
may not be based on content alone.7 In Planned Parenthood, the funding
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Further, when state action is directed at suppressing a particular viewpoint, the state must
show that the differential treatment is necessary to further a compelling interest. First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
70. See supra note 2.
71. See Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) (first amend-
ment forbids not only restrictions on a particular view, but also restrictions on an entire topic);
see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978) (courts must prohibit legislative
attempts to suppress certain speech and thus give preferential treatment to the other side of
a controversy); City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976) (essence of first amendment free speech clause is that government
may not create a monopoly for the expression of one viewpoint on an issue).
72. That the expression of one's view depends on funding is irrelevant in a first amendment
analysis. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 n.23 (1978). A refusal to subsidize
can be a violation of the first amendment. In Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), the
Supreme Court ruled that a state university, once it had opened it facilities for use by student
groups, could not deny use of those facilities to student groups that wished to discuss religious
issues. The Court declared that the university must be content-neutral toward speech. Id. at
277.
In Widmar, the state was using its funds to maintain facilities for student groups to use
to express their ideas. The Court was stating, in effect, that the university may not regulate
the use of its money in a manner that differentiated between content of speech. The Court
essentially held that as long as the university used its money to provide facilities for student
groups, the university could not restrict access to those facilities based on the content of a
group's speech. Id.
Similarly, in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), the Supreme Court found a first amend-
ment violation where a state university denied official recognition to a student group. Id. at
193-94. Official recognition would have enabled the group to hold meetings in the university's
facilities. Id. at 181. The Court declared that a state may not deny a government benefit because
the state disapproves of the views expressed by a particular group. Id. at 185-86. The Court
further stated that the fact that a group might be able to meet off campus did not alleviate
the impermissible action of the university. Id. at 183; see also Southeastern Promotions v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (that a privately-owned theater might be available is inconse-
quential to the city's denial of the use of its theater for a production); Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (an abridgement of one's exercise of first amendment speech rights
in appropriate places cannot be justified by saying that the right may be exercised elsewhere).
The principles of Widmar and Healy declare that a state may not regulate the use of its
property in a constitutionally impermissible manner. Money is state property just as is real
estate. Moreover, Healy states that the government may not deny any benefit in a constitu-
tionally impermissible manner. 408 U.S. at 181-83. Government funding is a government benefit.
It is inconceivable that the decisions in Widmar and Healy would have been different had
the state given each student group a stipend to rent private facilities instead of granting the
use of state facilities. In addition, the possibility that state grantees might be able to find private
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restriction gives preferential treatment to non-abortion counseling. Arizona's
funding scheme gives preferential treatment to one type of speech, and
therefore, is constitutionally suspect. 3
A content-based distinction, however, may be justified where the state can
demonstrate that such a distinction is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest.74 The governmental interest apparently relied on by Arizona is the
protection of life.7" Arizona's interest in protecting potential life is insuffi-
ciently compelling. In abortion cases dealing with a woman's fundamental
right to choose whether to continue a pregnancy, protecting potential life
has not been deemed a compelling state interest until the third trimester of
a woman's pregnancy. 6 Yet the Arizona funding scheme makes no reference
to any time period. Under the trimester test, Planned Parenthood's first am-
mendment rights presumably could be overidden if its counsellors recom-
mended abortions beyond the beginning of the third trimester. Absent a show-
ing of any infringement of this state interest, Arizona's interest is not suffi-
ciently compelling to justify a content-based distinction."
Indeed, even in the third trimester, Arizona should not be permitted to
maintain a speech preference because Arizona has other, narrower means
to protect its interest."8 Arizona may prohibit abortions after viability unless
necessary to save the life or health of a pregnant woman. Because Arizona
may protect its interest by prohibiting abortions in the third trimester, it
need not curtail speech about abortion to achieve its goal.' 9
funds to subsidize their abortion counseling program does not ameliorate the impermissible
content-based regulation imposed by Arizona.
73. See Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975) (attempts by a
state to repress expression of a view is presumptively unconstitutional); see also supra note
62 (first amendment mandates a presumption of unconstitutionality where a state accords dif-
ferential treatment to the content of speech).
74. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 954-55 (1983).
75. Although the Ninth Circuit never articulated Arizona's interest in creating the
discriminatory funding scheme, the court found the Supreme Court decision in Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 472, 478 (1977), to be controlling. In Maher the state's interest was protection
of potential life and encouraging normal childbirth. See Planned Parenthood, 718 F.2d at 943-44.
76. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). Only in post-viability, i.e., the third trimester,
does a state's interest in protecting potential life become sufficiently compelling to justify state
interference with the abortion decision. Id.; see also Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2492 (1983) (reaffirming Roe's mandate that a state has a compelling
interest only in post-viability fetal life).
77. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 313 (1980) (during first trimester a state has no
interest that justifies any intrusion in the pregnant woman's decisional process); cf. Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2492-93 (1983) (state regulations that
do not interfere with free consultation between counselor and client and that are based on
safeguarding women's health may be permissible during the first trimester).
78. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981) (to justify a content-based regulation,
the state must establish that the "regulation is narrowly drawn to achieve that end"); see also
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) (a narrowly drawn content-based distinction may
be permissible if no adequate alternative exists).
79. Although protection of potential life is a valid state interest as it relates to a woman's
fundamental right to decide whether to continue a pregnancy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
165-66 (1973), it has never been considered a valid justification for a regulation on speech
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Moreover, Arizona's content-based distinction inhibits the free flow of in-
formation about abortion. 0 The result of the scheme is to keep women
ignorant about abortion alternatives. Although pregnant women who seek
counseling probably know that abortion is an alternative, the Arizona scheme
promotes ignorance about the availability and health consequences of abor-
tion. Promoting ignorance has been recognized as an impermissible result
of a content-based distinction.' Having insufficient justification for a content-
based regulation, Arizona's funding system is an unconstitutional abridg-
ment of Planned Parenthood's first amendment right of free speech.
C. The Woman's Fundamental Right Claim
The Ninth Circuit's decision to allow Arizona to deny funds for abortion
counseling while funding non-abortion counseling not only allows Arizona
to violate Planned Parenthood's first amendment right, but also violates a
woman's fundamental right, as recognized in Roe v. Wade,82 to decide
about abortion, see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (decision cited Roe v. Wade,
and Doe v. Bolton, but did not discuss protection of potential life as a valid interest that
would justify a free speech abridgement).
80. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Supreme Court dealt with a Virginia
statute prohibiting anyone from soliciting legal business. The Court struck down the statute
as violative of the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 437. The Court stated that Virginia
could not prohibit a person from advising others of their legal rights and referring them to
attorneys for legal assistance. Id. at 434.
Although Arizona has not made it a crime to advise a woman of her legal right to have
an abortion, its funding scheme brings about the same result as would a criminal sanction.
A state-funded counselor risks losing all financial support for the family planning service if
the counselor advises a client of her abortion alternative. There is little difference between
the Button decision and the situation in Planned Parenthood. Both involve a state restricting
a person from advising another of a legal right and the various ways to effectuate those legal
rights. Compounding the situation in Planned Parenthood is the fact that the counseling also
includes medical advice. There is a first amendment violation, therefore, when Arizona pro-
hibits a family planning counselor from advising a client of her legal and medical right to
procure an abortion.
81. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 464-65 (1980);Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia Pharmacy the Court emphatically
rejected the argument that a state should prohibit the publication of prices for prescription
drugs because the state believed pharmacists would better protect consumers. Id. at 770. The
Court stated that the
alternative to this highly paternalistic approach [of keeping consumers in ignorance]
• . . is to assume that [the] information is not in itself harmful, that people will
perceive their own best interest if only they are well enough informed, and that
the best means to that end is to open the channel of communication rather than
to close them.
Id.; see Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1977) (basic constitu-
tional defect was in preventing the flow of information); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,
829 (1975) (dissemination of abortion information furthers policy of first amendment); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (policy of first amendment prohibits states from restric-
ting the amount of available knowledge).
82. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court declared that the right to decide whether to
continue a pregnancy is encompassed in one's fundamental right of privacy. Id. at 153. This
right was reaffirmed in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
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whether to continue a pregnancy. The court of appeals failed to consider
that funding only non-abortion speech infringes upon a woman's decision
making process.83 The appellate court again improperly relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Maher and thus failed to recognize how its outcome allows
Arizona to infringe upon a woman's fundamental right.8 4
In Maher, the Supreme Court extensively analyzed a state's decision not
to reimburse abortion expenses when the state reimbursed childbirth expenses
for indigent women. It concluded that the disparate funding scheme did not
impinge upon a woman's right to choose whether to continue a pregnancy."
The Court reasoned that funding one alternative but not the other did not
prevent women from choosing the nonfunded abortion alternative. 6 By reim-
bursing only childbirth expenses, the Court concluded that a state has only
made childbirth a more financially attractive alternative. 7 The Supreme
Court, however, did not hold that all disparate funding schemes disfavoring
abortion alternatives are constitutionally permissible. Indeed, in Maher the
Court declared that if a refusal to subsidize was based on impermissible
reasons, the refusal would be unconstitutional. 8  Therefore, each
discriminatory funding scheme, must be carefully analyzed to determine
whether it abridges a fundamental right.89 The Ninth Circuit, however, rotely
83. Another federal court, when faced with a similar funding scheme, held that not funding
abortion counseling unconstitutionally infringed upon a woman's decisional right. Planned Paren-
thood Ass'n-Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 531 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ill. 1981), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 700 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1983). On remand, the district court adopted
its previous analysis on the merits of the case. Planned Parenthood Ass'n-Chicago Area v.
Kempiners, 568 F. Supp. 1490 (N.D. Ill. 1983); see supra note 59 and infra note 97.
84. For a discussion of the court's inappropriate reliance on Maher in a first amendment
context, see supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
85. 432 U.S. at 474; see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
86. 432 U.S. at 474; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980) (refusal to use
federal funds for reimbursement of abortion expenses while reimbursing childbirth expenses
placed no governmental obstacle in women's decision-making process).
87. 432 U.S. at 474. In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), the Court elaborated, stating
that the government's unequal subsidization of the alternatives to a pregnancy only encouraged
women to pick one of the alternatives. Id. at 316. The Court emphasized that the government
had placed no obstacle in the counselor-client relationship that would interfere with the deci-
sional process. Id. at 317. Indigency, according to the Court, was the reason a woman could
not avail herself of all alternatives to a pregnancy. Id. at 316. The Court concluded that the
government was not required to remove obstacles it had not created. Id. at 317.
In contrast, in Planned Parenthood it is Arizona that has created an obstacle in the deci-
sional process. Arizona has voluntarily created a family planning program that provides counseling
on a limited and incomplete number of alternatives to pregnancy. Limiting the spectrum of
available knowledge to women who are deciding whether to continue pregnancies is a state-
created obstacle, unlike the indigency obstacle in Harris. See supra notes 16-18 and accom-
panying text.
88. 432 U.S. at 469-70 The manner in which a state uses its funds is subject to constitu-
tional norms. Id.
89. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 568 F. Supp. 1490, 1496
(N.D. Il. 1983), where the court stated:
It is not a sufficient answer that the challenged conduct involves only a refusal
to subsidize. If that were enough the state could, for example, deny welfare to
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applied Maher without questioning whether the particular funding scheme
unduly interferes with a woman's decision to continue or terminate her
pregnancy."9
Maher is not controlling precedent in this case because the funding scheme
in Maher9 did not interfere with a woman's decision making process.92
Arizona's decision to prevent state-funded family planning providers from
engaging in abortion counseling limits the amount of information available
to a woman seeking counseling, and thus unduly interferes with a woman's
decision. By refusing to allow the use of state money for abortion counsel-
ing, Arizona prohibits state grantees from informing their clients of all
available options to a pregnancy."
In fact, one federal court struck down a statute similar to Arizona's for
the very reason that denying state money for abortion counseling while
funding non-abortion counseling unduly interfered with a woman's right to
decide whether to continue a pregnancy.94 In Planned Parenthood Associa-
tion Chicago Area v. Kempiners," the district court held that Illinois' refusal
to subsidize abortion counseling while susidizing non-abortion counseling con-
stituted direct state interference with a woman's decision making process. 6
The court reasoned that the right to choose whether to abort would be of
slight value if the decision could not be made in an informed manner.9"
blacks, Republicans, or persons who merely spoke out against the incumbent ad-
ministration's policies, and defend itself by arguing that [these] persons were no
worse off than if the state had provided no welfare at all. The appropriate test
is not whether the challenged conduct involves a refusal to subsidize, but rather
whether that refusal is based on a constitutionally permissible criterion.
Id.
90. If a fundamental right is abridged by a funding scheme, the abridgement will only be
allowed if necessary to further a compelling state interest. See supra note 54. If no fundamen-
tal right is infringed, then the scheme must only be rationally related to a legitimate state in-
terest. Maher, 432 U.S. at 470.
91. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
92. 432 U.S. at 474. Funding childbirth expenses only made childbirth a more financially
attractive alternative. Id. In Maher, the state made no effort "to prevent women from making
a fully informed decision." Planned Parenthood Ass'n Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 568 F.
Supp. 1490, 1498 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The funding scheme faced by the Ninth Circuit, however,
directly affected women's decisional processes by regulating the information received in counseling
sessions.
93. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 568 F. Supp. 1490, 1496-99
(N.D. Il1. 1983). The state was manipulating a women's decision-making process by ensuring
that she was counseled only on her non-abortion alternatives by state-funded family planning
counselors. Id. at 1496; accord Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct.
2481, 2500 (1983) (state's interest in ensuring that a woman's decision to abort was informed
did not permit the state to enact regulations which were designed to influence a woman's choice
between abortion and childbirth).
94. Planned Parenthood Ass'n-Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 531 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ill.
1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 700 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1983). On remand,
the district court adopted its previous analysis. 568 F. Supp. 1490 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
95. 568 F. Supp. 1490 (N.D. II. 1983).
96. Id. at 1499.
97. Id. at 1498-99. The statute in Kempiners, like the one upheld by the Ninth Circuit,
prohibited the use of state money for abortion counseling. 531 F. Supp. at 324. The federal
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The court also recognized that the free flow of information between the
counselor and the client was essential to the exercise of the decisional right.98
To obtain full knowledge of all available options, a woman must be able
to rely on her counselor to give her all necessary information.99
The Kempiners decision follows from the Supreme Court's recognition of
the importance of freedom in the counseling relationship. In previous abor-
tion cases, the Court stringently guarded the decision making process from
undue state interference.' Just last term in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health,'"' the Court struck down a variety of laws that in-
terferred with the counselor-client relationship.' 2 The Court recognized the
necessity of allowing the counselor the freedom to decide the type and quan-
tity of information that the client should receive."' 3 Although the decision
in Akron involved an ordinance that required pregnancy counselors to im-
part certain facts to clients,' 4 the unconstitutional interference in the deci-
sion-making process is the same when a state prohibits a state-funded
court in Kempiners declared that when a state funds only non-abortion counseling and does
not fund abortion counseling, the state is attempting to create a program in which women
seeking help in deciding whether to continue a pregnancy would be given incomplete and one-
sided information. 568 F. Supp. at 1496.
98. 531 F. Supp. at 328.
99 Id.
100. The Supreme Court stated:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying
[the abortion option] altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically
diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional off-
spring, may force upon a woman a distressful life and future. Mental and physical
health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child
into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it ...
All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician will consider in
consultation.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (emphasis added); see also Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2491 (1983) (to fully vindicate a woman's decisional
right, her physician must be allowed to exercise her best judgment in the counseling relation-
ship); Collautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 389 (1979) (important to allow physician enough
discretion to determine the choice of abortion method to preserve life or health of mother);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976) (state not allowed to control
what physician must disclose to patient in the counseling session); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 197 (1973) (woman has right to receive medical care according to her doctor's professional
judgment).
101. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
102. The Supreme Court struck down, as undue interference with a woman's decisional right,
a parental consent requirement, a twenty-four mandatory waiting period, and an informed consent
provision that required a physician to impart certain information to a patient. Id.
103. Id. at 2491.
104. Id. at 2500. The Court described the list of required disclosures as a "parade of hor-
ribles" designed to persuade a woman to decide against abortion. Id. The Court held that
the inflexible, mandated disclosure unduly interfered with a woman's decisional process by placing
obstacles on her counselor upon whom she was entitled to rely for advice. Id. at 2501; see
also Freiman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 941 (1979) (govern-
ment may not mandate that certain information be disclosed to a woman who is deciding whether
to abort without regard to whether the information is medically advisable).
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counselor from informing clients about abortion." °5 Both situations involve
a state trying to control the type of information that clients receive."' Because
health counselors are the best judge of what information needs to be
disclosed,' 7 the Arizona funding scheme unconstitutionally restricts the in-
formation state grantees may impart to clients."'0
CRITICISM AND IMPACT
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Planned Parenthood permits Arizona to
abridge the constitutional rights of both Planned Parenthood and women
who seek counseling from state-funded family planning organizations. The
court erred in remanding the case and should have struck down the statute
as unconstitutional. If Arizona can prove that Planned Parenthood is unable
to keep separate accounts, the statute will be deemed constitutional. Arizona
may, therefore, use the statute to deny funds to other nongovernmental family
planning entities without first showing that these entities would be unable
to keep separate accounts of their abortion and non-abortion activities. These
entities would then be forced to challenge the statute, as applied to them,
in court."'
Moreover, by allowing Arizona to maintain a content-based distinction
in funding family planning counseling, the Ninth Circuit has permitted the
Arizona legislature to impose its view of morality on Arizona residents.'"'
105. Planned Parenthood Ass'n Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 568 F. Supp. 1490, 1497-98
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (Akron was premised on the importance of the counseling relationship and
the necessity of a state refraining from placing restrictions on the type of information counselors
must utilize). Funding non-abortion counseling but not abortion counseling serves a state's in-
terest in protecting potential life only by affecting a woman's decisional process. Id. at 1498.
106. In Akron, the city council sought to force certain information on a woman who was
deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy. 103 S. Ct. at 2501. In Planned Parenthood, the
Arizona legislature ensured that state grantees would not impart abortion information to a
client by funding only non-abortion counseling and prohibiting the use of state money for
abortion counseling. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n-Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 531 F. Supp.
320, 329 (N.D. Ill. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 700 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1983).
107. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2501 (1983) (physi-
cian should determine, in her best medical judgment, what information is relevant to a woman's
decision whether to continue a pregnancy); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604-05 n.33
(1977) (where state regulation of physician upon whom a woman is relying for abortion counseling
has an impact on the decisional process, that regulation is unconstitutional); Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976) (cannot straightjacket a physician in the practice
of her profession).
108. For a discussion of why Arizona has no compelling interest that justifies an infringe-
ment on a constitutional right, see supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
109. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) (Supreme Court will scrutinize how
a statute will apply in other situations besides the one before it in determining whether the
statute violates the first amendment).
110. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 332 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (refusal to
use federal funds to reimburse abortion costs was a legislative attempt to impose one view
of morality on an intimately personal decision); see also Note, Abortion Regulation: The Cir-
cumscription of State Intervention by the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 15 GA. L. REv. 681,
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Abortion is one of the most controversial issues of the day and an issue
on which people have very strong views.'" The United States Constitution,
however, was designed to ensure that majoritarian views do not abridge the
constitutional rights of a minority."' By funding non-abortion counseling
and not abortion counseling, the Arizona legislature granted preferential treat-
ment to a view it favored, and therefore, forced its view of family planning
on Planned Parenthood." 3
The decision also violates the substantive due process rights of women
who seek counseling from state grantees. By upholding Arizona's refusal
to fund abortion counseling while funding non-abortion counseling, the court
has allowed Arizona to sponsor a family planning service that seeks to en-
sure that women receive incomplete and misleading information." 4 Inade-
quate information could lead to unfortunate health ramifications.
According to the Arizona statute, a state-funded family planning counselor
is unable to inform clients of their abortion alternative unless their life is
threatened by pregnancy."' There are a variety of severe and permanent
681 (1981) (groups that oppose abortion on moral grounds pressure legislatures to enact con-
troversial laws regulating abortion)[hereinafter cited as Note, Abortion Regulation]. See generally
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (judiciary should
vigilantly protect individuals in the exercise of unpopular actions and expression of unpopular
views).
111. Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the Abortion Con-
troversy, 31 BtFFALO L. REV. 107, 107 (1982) (abortion controversy as strong as ever); see
also Note, Abortion Regulation, supra note 110, at 681 (abortion is still an intensely debated
controversy).
112. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Supreme
Court decisions mandate that a state may not deny access to a particular view solely because
the state disapproves of that view); see also Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1977) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (governmental actions that are designed to encourage non-abortion alternatives
are really intended to "impose a moral viewpoint that no State may constitutionally enforce");
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 457 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (even though govern-
ment might strenuously object to an idea or action, government may not inhibit the right of
the public to learn about such ideas); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (Constitution designed to protect minorities from majoritarian viewpoints).
113. See Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(implicit in right to decide whether to abort is right to make decision "in defiance of the con-
trary opinion of the sovereign"); Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 777-78 (7th Cir. 1980) (allowing
legislature to determine what information is required to make the abortion decision is the anti-
thesis to the nature of the privacy right involved).
114. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n-Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 531 F. Supp. 320, 329
(N.D. Il. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 700 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1983) (state
prevented women from making informed choices whether to abort).
115. See supra notes 2 and 29. The fact that a state grantee might be able to refer a client
to another counselor to discuss an abortion alternative does not save the funding scheme from
abridging women's decisional right. The Supreme Court said that "[tlhere is no evidence sug-
gesting that the abortion procedure will be performed more safely" if there is a 24-hour delay.
In accordance with the ethical standards of the profession, a physician will advise the patient
to defer the abortion when he thinks this will be beneficial to her. Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2503 (1983). The Supreme Court has recognized
that time is an essential factor in the abortion decision as the longer a woman delays an abor-
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medical complications, not life threatening, that may befall a pregnant woman
when an abortion may be medically recommended. A state grantee would
be unable to suggest that such a woman consider an abortion because her
life is not threatened.' 6 Any psychological illness, absent suicidal tenden-
cies, would not threaten the life of a woman, and therefore, a state-funded
counselor would not be able to suggest an abortion as a means of preserv-
ing psychological health." 7 A woman who is pregnant with a severely de-
formed fetus similarly would be unable to receive counseling on her abor-
tion alternatives.'' 8 Furthermore, the statute does not allow a state grantee
to counsel a woman who is pregnant from rape or incest on her abortion
option. ' 9 The psychological damage that may result from carrying such a
pregnancy to term is undeniable. That the Arizona statute denies counseling
for abortion in these instances exemplifies the statute's basic flaw. The
statute's paramount defect is that the Arizona legislature is making a medical
decision that is best left to women themselves and health professionals.' 20
The lesson of Roe v. Wade and the command of the first amendment is
1) that women have a right to decide whether or not to have an abortion,' 2 '
and 2) that counselors must be free to exercise their best judgment as to
what information clients need when making family planning decisions. Absent
complete information, these fundamental concerns have little meaning.
In addition to affecting the rights of Planned Parenthood and Arizona
women, the appellate court has paved the way for other states in the Ninth
Circuit to enact similar funding laws. The abridgment of free speech rights
and substantive due process rights may now be extended to family planning
providers and women in eight other states.'22 Moreover, a federal court of
appeals decision is persuasive authority in the other circuits. The Eighth Cir-
tion, the procedure becomes medically riskier. Id.; see also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,
412-13 (1981) (abortion decision may entail grave emotional and psychological consequences);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198 (1973) (time is critical in abortion decision as health risks
to women increase as pregnancy advances).
116. Women's Health Services v. Maher, 482 F. Supp. 725 (D. Conn.), rev'd, 636 F.2d 23
(2d Cir. 1980). The district court reheard the case. 514 F. Supp. 265 (D. Conn. 1981). Severe
and permanent health problems that may plague women if a pregnancy is carried to term in-
clude: "all auto-immune diseases (rheumatic arthitis, multiple sclerosis, lupus, etc.); chronic
heart, liver, and kidney diseases; chronic anemia; diabetes; phlebitis; toxemia; . . . hyperten-
tion." 482 F. Supp. at 730-31.
117. 482 F. Supp. at 731; accord United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) (where
abortion is necessary to preserve life of a pregnant woman, a physician should consider
psychological, as well as physiological, factors).
118. Women's Health Services v. Maher, 482 F. Supp. 725, 731 (D. Conn.), rev'd, 636 F.2d
23 (2d Cir. 1980).
119. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Hyde Amendment allowed Medicaid reim-
bursements where pregnancy resulted from rape or incest).
120. See supra note 100.
121. The decision of whether to have an abortion is limited by the Court to the period of
fetal non-viability, i.e. prior to the third trimester. See supra notes 53 and 55.
122. The Ninth Circuit includes the following states and territories: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the North Mariana Islands.
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cuit has twice reviewed similar statutes, but invalidated them on other
grounds.' 23 A federal district court, faced with a statute similar to Arizona's,
found free speech and substantive due process violations.'2 4 The Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision, therefore, is the only federal appellate court decision to uphold
this disparate funding scheme. Unless the Supreme Court intervenes to cor-
rect the errors in the Ninth Circuit's analysis, Arizona will continue to abridge
the constitutional rights of family planning providers and Arizona women.
CONCLUSION
In Planned Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit held that Arizona was not con-
stitutionally required to fund abortion counseling while funding non-abortion
counseling. The court acknowledged that Arizona may not be able to withhold
state funds from Planned Parenthood's non-abortion counseling solely because
part of Planed Parenthood's total program involves abortion counseling.
Nevertheless, the court remanded the case to allow Arizona to show that
withholding all state money from Planned Parenthood is the only way to
ensure that no state funds would be used for abortion counseling.
The Ninth Circuit erred in not striking down the Arizona appropriation
scheme as a facially unconstitutional penalty on Planned Parenthood's first
amendment speech rights. When the court held that Arizona was not re-
quired to subsidize abortion counseling while subsidizing non-abortion
counseling, the court allowed Arizona to create a content-based distinction
in violation of the first amendment. A woman's due process right to decide
whether to continue a pregnancy is also infringed by the Arizona statute.
The Ninth Circuit has allowed Arizona to impose its view of family plann-
ing on Planned Parenthood and Arizona residents. By permitting state-funded
counselors to counsel for abortion only when a woman's life is threatened,
Arizona has unduly restricted the exercise of both a woman's right to choose
to terminate her pregnancy, and a health counselor's best judgment when
counseling a client.
Sharon McConaha
123. See Valley Family Planning v. North Dakota, 661 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1981) (Supremacy
Clause violation); Planned Parenthood v. Minnesota, 612 F.2d 359 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 448 U.S.
901 (1980) (equal protection violation).
124. Planned Parenthood Ass'n Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 568 F. Supp. 1490 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
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